

**Boko Haram's resilience and the porosity of Nigerian border**

Aminu Idris & \*Assel Tutumlu

Department of International Relations/Political Science,  
Near East University,  
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

\*Corresponding author: [assel.tutumlu@neu.edu.tr](mailto:assel.tutumlu@neu.edu.tr)

**Abstract**

There are several scholarly debates over why the Boko Haram insurgency persists. The vast literature neglects whether or not Nigeria's border porosity is an aiding factor that enables members of the sect to receive support funds, training, smuggle arms, and mercenaries from foreign terrorist groups operating in the neighbouring countries and beyond. The mission of the terror group is to violently overthrow Nigeria's secular structure and pave the way for the establishment of an Islamic state. To counter this threat, the Nigerian government responded through military offensive, negotiation, and amnesty for the repentant insurgents. After about two decades, the insurgent's violent attacks continue to escalate in an alarming proportion. This article relies mainly on an in-depth interview with relevant stakeholders, such as members of the Nigeria Armed forces, border security agents, residents of Nigeria's borderlands among others and revealed a causal relationship between Nigeria's border porosity and the resilience of the Boko Haram insurgency. It, therefore, recommends the need for Nigeria to deny Boko Haram access to any kind of external support by re-examining its bordering strategies to delink Boko Haram from foreign terror organizations.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram; resilient insurgency; border porosity; border security; Nigeria-Niger frontier.

## Introduction

The *Jama'atu ahlissunna lid da'awati wal Jihad* (meaning a group propagating the teachings of the Prophet and *Jihad*) also known as Boko Haram (literally means Western education is forbidden) was founded by a radical Islamic scholar, Sheik Muhammad Yusuf in 2002 with its headquarters in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, Nigeria.<sup>1</sup> Boko Haram started as a movement, preaching and mobilizing youth against Western education and ideology in a mosque called *Markaz* in the ancient city of Maiduguri (Adeniyi 2011). The killing of the sect members in Kananmmain town in Yobe State during a bloody encounter with the Nigerian police and the subsequent extra-judicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf (leader of the movement) and his top disciples in July 2009 by the Nigerian Police has aided the transformation of the movement into a violent terror group (Gorman 2009).

After the killing of Muhammad Yusuf, Muhammad Shekau emerged as the new leader of the Boko Haram using violent warfare tactics against the Nigerian security forces whom he accused of killing his members (John 2013). Towards the end of 2009 and 2010, the sect members were overwhelmed by the security forces but later resurfaced in a more coordinated and organized hierarchy using guerilla war tactics attacking and the bombing of churches, mosques, and security formations across northeastern Nigeria (Meehan and Spier 2011). Nigeria's inability to decisively defeat Boko Haram enabled it to evolve from a mere religious movement to a violent international terror organization operating not only in Nigeria but the other West African States with allegiance to Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and Al- Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) (Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos 2014). Places such as the United Nations building, Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja, and the Nigerian military command and staff college Jaji among others were attacked by the Boko Haram insurgents (John 2013).

Distressed by the escalating deadly attacks, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency on 4 April 2013 in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe state to curtail the excesses of the group by commanding the Nigerian military to clear the northeastern region from the scourge of Boko Haram insurgents. The year 2013 marked the beginning of a full military offensive against the Boko Haram insurgents in the northeast and subsequently to other parts of Nigeria.<sup>2</sup>

The failure of the Nigerian military offensive to contain the Boko Haram insurgency led to the introduction of negotiation between the sect and the Nigerian government as well as amnesty for the repentant Boko Haram insurgents that willingly surrender their arms and denounce insurgency. However, despite all the efforts mentioned above by the Nigerian government to end Boko Haram insurgency in the country, the

---

<sup>1</sup> Interview with renowned Islamic scholar and an associate of late Muhammad Yusuf (former leader of Boko Haram), Damaturu, Yobe State, Nigeria. 16 May 2019.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with a senior serving officer of the Nigerian army who was a commanding officer in Maiduguri. Abuja, Nigeria. 11 June 2019.

terror group is still much on the ground with better-sophisticated weapons than the Nigerian military, an indication that the end of the war is not in sight (The New York Times 2019).

Previous studies have attributed the resilience of Boko Haram insurgency to the inadequate workforce, insufficient arms and ammunition, lack of familiarity of the Nigerian armed forces with the northeastern terrain where the Boko Haram insurgents operate, corruption among the Nigerian military hierarchy and pervasive poverty in the northeast region. Other reasons given are lack of coordination and intelligent gathering/sharing among Nigeria's security agencies, human rights abuses by the Nigerian military, high level of illiteracy, and the high rate of youth unemployment. (Kagwanja 2006; Levan 2013; Okpara *et al.* 2015; Okpara *et al.* 2015; Vesselin and Maiangwa 2016; Babatunde 2018; Nwali 2018; Olarewaju and Lastwa 2018) Thus, none of the previous studies establishes a direct causality between the resilience of the Boko Haram insurgency and the porosity of the Nigerian land borders.

To this end, the existing literature on the Boko Haram insurgency is uncertain as to whether or not Nigeria's border porosity is an aiding factor that fuels Boko Haram insurgency. Consequently, there is a need to ascertain the extent to which the Nigerian border porosity allow Boko Haram to illegally cross the borders, pay allegiance to international terror groups, build an international network, receive support funds, training, smuggle arms, and mercenaries. With external strategic and logistics support, Boko Haram was able to introduce new tactics to target military formations, places of worship, schools, attack highways, government establishments, abduct and kills civilians with impunity. It is against the foregoing that this article interrogates the resilience of Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria's porous borders perspective.

## **Methodology**

The article utilized qualitative data collected through ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interview with key informants to interrogate the resilience of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria despite all the efforts by the Nigerian authorities to contain it. The in-depth interviews were organized with both the Nigerian military and border security personnel in the States of Borno, Yobe, Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina and Abuja. Other categories of respondents are independent security consultants with expertise on Nigerian porous borders, renowned academics on security and migration studies from local universities, religious and border community leaders. The interviews were conducted from May 2019 and last through January 2020. Equally, relevant information was collected through textbooks, academic journals, magazines, newspapers, seminar papers, and special reports on Boko Haram from relevant sources. The respondents were selected based on their role, expertise, knowledge of the Boko Haram insurgency. For ethical reasons, the identity and rights of the respondents are adequately protected even though their affiliations, expertise, dates and place of the interview were disclosed for clarity.

## **A Theoretical Exploration of Bordering and Border**

There are different contending theoretical perspectives on the border and bordering process. One perspective which is perhaps the dominant notion is the realist narrative which views borders as territorial hard lines

separating a nation-state from others. Such hard lines are "strategic" to state's claim to sovereignty; thus, borders have to be militarily "defended" or even "breached" to deter incursions by other states (Andreas 2003). The realist perspective emphasizes national security and conceives border relations as inter-state phenomena in which each of the contiguous states desires and attempts to dominate and use it to its advantage even to the detriment of the security and survival of other states. Similarly, Agnew (2008 p.175) submits that "borders are artefacts of dominant discursive processes that have led to the fencing off of chunks of territory and people from one another". Agnew further contends that "borders matter not only because they have real effects, but also because they trap thinking about and acting in the world in territorial terms" (p.175).

The above submission implies that "from the moment [borders] are established, there are always individuals and groups who have an interest in finding ways to move beyond the barriers. They may be seeking jobs, visiting families, smuggling goods, drugs or arms trafficking" (Newman 2003, p.14). Enriching the discourse, Vaughan-Williams (2012) posits that the border is not a natural, neutral nor static but historically contingent, politically charged, a dynamic phenomenon that first and foremost involves people and their everyday lives. Therefore, "as a central feature of the architecture of global politics...state border can be thought of as a sort of compass. It orients the convergence of people with a given territory and notions of a common history, nationality, identity, language, and culture" (Vaughan-Williams 2012, p.3).

David Newman's notion of a "borderless world" offers a counter-narrative to the traditional perspective on the border and bordering processes. Under this perspective, which, the extant literature on border refers to a transnational, view "the lines which are borders are (considered to be) as flexible as they were once thought to be rigid, reflecting new territorial and a spatial pattern of human behaviour" (Newman 2003, p.13). Amplifying this position further, Newman opines that "borders should be seen for their potentials to constitute bridges and points of contact, as much as they have traditionally constituted barriers to movement and communication" (Newman 2006, p.143). Borders so conceived underscore the reality of transnationalism (Goldberg 2001) and the often accompanying cross-border interactions and co-operation, leading to the convergence of domestic governance and external affairs.

Unlike the realist perspective, which is state/physical line-centric, the transnational view is part of the liberal tradition, especially commercial liberalism which accentuates the inter-dependence of states and mutual interactions and co-operations that flow from it. Thompson (2007) points out that these interactions and states' convergence, especially in the area of international trade, is facilitated by globalization and modern technologies, particularly information and communications technologies that diminish or render the barriers posed by physical borders redundant. However, Newman (2003, p.13) observes that these technologies have also created "new sets of borders and boundaries, enclosing groups with common identities and interests who are dispersed throughout the globe, lacking any form of territorial compactness and contiguity".

When a border is perceived through this prism, it takes the meaning of border "beyond its traditional notion to encompass other notions, each of which defines a diverse set of affiliations and identities" (Newman 2003, p.22). It is, therefore, impracticable to use physical force alone to secure borders that are not contiguous since they are dispersed and only connected by similarity in identity or group membership. Again, inhabitants

of the border communities, who in some cases share similarities in language and culture are usually apprehensive of any attempt to regulate their movements in and out of either side of the border by border guards; thus they try to circumvent border security. For instance, in the Nigeria-Niger Republic borderland which is inhabited mainly by the Hausa, "feeling more Nigerian or Nigérien does not result in the diminution of their 'Hausa-ness'", thus the borderline makes little or no difference to them (Miles. 2005. p. 297). Thus, any attempt to restrict their free movement in and out of the border is usually seen as an encroachment on their homeland.

In his seminal work, Paasi (2009) provides yet another nuanced and stimulating counter-perspective on the manifestation of the border and bordering process. For Paasi, "space and power are related today in asymmetric and rather unpredictable ways" (p.216). Therefore, "a border study concentrating on borders themselves inevitably misses something, since – if we understand them as social practices and discourses that are impregnated with power and ordering – borders 'are spread' all over societies, not merely confined to the border areas" (Paasi 2009, p.224).

On a rather queer note, many philosophers consider borders as neither genuine nor reality but “merely mental constructions” embedded in “mathematical abstractions”. But then, “if we are interested in the mechanisms of constant border crossing that are characteristic of human evolution”, such abstraction of borders may not help (Marsico & Varzi 2015, p.6).

By and large, what could be extrapolated from the preceding theoretical exploration is that borders are "complex phenomena" as they are "boundary sets comprised of overlapping geopolitical, socio-cultural, economic and biophysical layers and are the outcome of a bordering process" (Haselsberger 2014). Borders are always in motion, and their meaning depends on time, space, and context. Therefore, studies and theories about borders need to take cognizance of the varying nature of borders (Konrad 2015) since it is by so doing that holistic understanding of the phenomena in their various dimensions/manifestations is possible.

Despite the above varying scholarly opinions on borders and bordering process, what is not debatable among scholars is the need for states to secure their borders against every form of trans-border crime. States, particularly Nigeria must, therefore, effectively control their borders to contain border crimes such as arms, human and drugs trafficking, smuggling of goods, illegal crossing/immigration and host of other border crimes by individuals, groups or States. The next section would explore the efforts of Nigerian borders to examine the extent to which the Nigerian borders are either secured or porous.

### **An overview of Nigeria's efforts in combating Boko Haram insurgency**

Nigeria's effort to combat the Boko Haram insurgency has been ongoing for over a decade mainly through a militaristic approach. The level of success recorded remains a topic of debate, but what is not arguable is that Nigeria is yet to win the war against the Boko Haram insurgency.<sup>3</sup> The war against the sect started before the year 2013. However, the full military offensive against the group commenced in May 2013 after the

---

<sup>3</sup> Interview with a senior research fellow at the Center for Peace Studies at Usmanu Danfodio University, Sokoto, Nigeria. 25 August 2019.

declaration of a state of emergency by President Goodluck Jonathan (Sodipo 2013). After the declaration, the Nigerian armed forces deployed a large number of military battalions, sophisticated military hardwares, shut down communications in the affected areas and launch an onslaught against the Boko Haram. The superior power of the Nigerian military forced the insurgents to relocate to the Sambisa forest, which is located about 60 kilometres away from Maiduguri city, Borno State. (Aljazeera, 2019).

Subsequently, Boko Haram introduced guerilla war tactics targeting civilians in markets places, highways, places of worship, and government establishments. The guerilla's war tactics compounded the problem with each side claiming victory until 2014 when the insurgents took over the control 22 local government and declared the territories under its control as *Daula* (Islamic territory) under a *caliph* (Islamic leader) and Gwoza town as the seat of the caliphate (Olarewaju and Lastwa 2018). Between 2014 and 2016 when the activities of the sect were at their pick, and the Nigerian army seemed to be overstretched by the Boko Haram insurgents' hit-and-run tactics, President Muhammadu Buhari directed the relocation of military command Headquarters to Maiduguri, the Borno state capital.<sup>4</sup> It also necessitates the formation of the civilian joint task force popularly known as *civilian JTF*<sup>5</sup> to complement the effort of the Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko Haram insurgent.<sup>6</sup>

The split of Boko Haram on 26 January 2012, compounded the war as two groups emerged with different leadership. The first group retained the original name and was headed by Abubakar Shekau with an allegiance to ISIS. In contrast, the splinter group (Ansaru) group known as *Jama'atu ansarul muslimina fi biladis Sudan* (people for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa), popularly known as "Ansaru" is headed by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. The Abubakar Shekau faction target every category of people who are sympathetic to western education including, Muslims, Christians, civilians, military, male and female while the Barnawi's faction mostly targets the military personnel, public institutions, and military formations (Zenn 2013). The implication of the Boko Haram split implies that the Nigerian security forces would have to confront two or multiple insurgent groups in different locations, with different warfare tactics, and philosophies at the same time.

As the battle continues, Boko Haram started attacking banks, highways, markets, villages and abduction for ransom to raise money for the purchase of arms and ammunitions. The abduction of nearly 300 Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014 portrayed the incapacity of the Nigerian armed forces to secure Nigerians, particularly vulnerable civilians in rural communities, schools, and markets. The abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls drew the attention of the international community which necessitated the intervention of the International Committee for the Red Cross to negotiate the release of 103 girls from Boko Haram (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). Furthermore, the Boko Haram used the ransom collected from government for the

<sup>4</sup> Interview with one of the military commanders in the Maiduguri, Borno State. 24 May 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Civilian JTF is made up of youth who voluntarily use locally made weapons to complement the Nigerian military in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents

<sup>6</sup> Interview with a community leader in Damaturu, Yobe State Nigeria. 14 June 2019.

release of Chibok School girls to purchase arms which significantly increase their armory.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, many schools, markets, and highways were shut down by the Nigerian authorities making life more miserable for thousands of people in the northeast.<sup>8</sup> The failure of the President Goodluck Jonathan's administration to contain the Boko Haram insurgency was one of the factors that led to his defeat in the 2015 general elections by the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari who promised to end the Boko Haram insurgency within six months (Olawaju and Lastwa 2018:79). As part of his strategies, in 2016, President Muhammadu Buhari launched a National Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism to comprehensively contain the excesses of the Boko Haram and promote community dialogue (Punch 2016). In addition, in 2017 he launched a Presidential Committee on Northeast Initiative with the mandate for reconstruction, rehabilitation, radicalization, and reintegration of repentant Boko Haram insurgents (Ogunmande and Olugbode 2017).

However, after the expiration of the President Buhari's first term in 2019 and the commencement of his second term in 2019 till date, the New York Times reports that the Boko Haram insurgents continue to launch massive attacks not only on civilians but military formations across the northeastern region with impunity. They used more sophisticated weapons than the Nigerian military, including drones, armoured tanks, and rocket launchers. Also, four out of the ten northern Borno zones are under the control of Boko Haram (The New York Times 2019). The Global Conflict Tracker reports that between May 2011 and March 2020, 37,500 people were killed, 2.5 million people were internally displaced, and nearly 244,000 Nigerians were rendered refugees by the Boko Haram insurgency (Global Conflict Tracker 2020). With these figures and still counting, the Nigerian war against Boko Haram is yet to be over despite the liberation of many local governments that were hitherto under the control of Boko Haram. The claim by the Nigerian government that Boko Haram insurgents technically defeated implies that progress is distinct from victory.<sup>9</sup> These unabated attacks by the Boko Haram sect call for strategic re-thinking and critical interrogation.

### ***Why Nigeria's war against Boko Haram insurgency persist in northeastern Nigeria?***

There are different explanations as to why the war against the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria persist for over a decade despite successive government commitment. Some of these explanations include over-reliance on the military, lack of political will to deal with perpetrators and sponsors of the insurgency, and pervasive corruption, particularly among the military hierarchy. Other reasons include shrinking of resources, especially drying up of Lake Chad River as a result of climate change, high rate of poverty, high level of youth unemployment, extra-judicial killing and human rights abuses by the Nigerian security forces.

Olusola (2007) argues that insurgency persists in Nigeria as a result of government inability both at the federal, states, and local government levels to decisively deal with perpetrators of violence, including the

---

<sup>7</sup> Interview with a Staff of Citizenship and Leadership Training Center and an indigene of Bama Local government. Gusau, Zamfara State. 14 July 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with a member of the Civilian Joint Task Force. Maiduguri, Borno State. 2 January 2020.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with a Professor of security studies at the University of Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria. 28 June 2019.

Boko Haram insurgency (Olusola 2017). However, Olusola's argument is deficient for the fact that many arrests and convictions of Boko Haram members and their accomplice were made. For instance, the high ranking member of Boko Haram who masterminded the 2015 Abuja bomb attack that killed over 15 people was arrested and prosecuted by the Nigerian security agencies (VOA 2018).

Vesselin and Maiangwa (2016) blamed the persistence of the Boko Haram insurgency on the failure of the Nigerian government to exercise its constitutional responsibilities of protection of lives and properties of the citizens. He pointed out that every human endeavour is secondary to the security of lives and properties of citizens. As such, the government must live up to its constitutional responsibility. He further argues that the inability of the government to protect its citizens, makes them resort to self-help by acquiring arms to defend themselves from Boko Haram insurgents. This acquisition of illegal arms consequently increases the number of illicit arms in circulation (Vesselin and Maiangwa 2016). However, Vesselin and Maiangwa's argument fails to interrogate the sources of these arms but rather concentrate on their consequences in fueling insurgency in Nigeria.

Olarewaju and Lastwa (2006) blamed corruption as the main reason why the war against the Boko Haram insurgency persists. In 2019, Transparency International named Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The country is ranked as 146 of the 180 countries (Transparency International 2019). Most often, monies budgeted for war against insurgency are either looted or diverted by the public officers in charge of national security. For instance, in 2015, the former National Security Adviser (NSA), high ranking civil servants and other top politicians were arraigned before the Nigerian court for diverting \$2.1 billion meant for the procurement of arms meant for fighting Boko Haram insurgents (Olarewaju and Lastwa 2018:87).

Oyewole (2015) argues that poverty and widening inequality remains one of the significant challenges for Nigeria's war against insurgency. The country is ranked 152 of the 157 countries in terms of human capital development. The high rate of poverty is even more pervasive in the north, particularly northeast. For instance, while the South West has 30.6%, the South-South 37.6%, the South East 39%, the North Central 48.8%, North West 58% North East represents the highest with 59.7%. Oyewole further, argues that the high level of poverty in the Lake Chad region has contributed to the worsening economic and political unrest in the region and was mainly responsible for the insecurity in northeastern Nigeria which spreads to other parts of the country (Oyewole 2015).

Another worrisome factor that fuels Boko Haram insurgency is that unemployed youth is at the centre stage in the membership drive of the Boko Haram. The inability of Nigerian government to counter the unemployed youth recruitment strategy of Boko Haram has further aggravated insurgency and persistently increase the number of Boko Haram fighters (Maza, et al. 2020). Maza argues that with the current youth unemployment in Nigeria, the country is sitting on a time bomb, as no nation will know peace with the majority of its youth unemployed. As the saying goes, an empty mind is a devil workshop. Similarly, Babatunde (2018) contend that the high rate of youth unemployment has rendered large chunk of northeast youth potential members of Boko Haram.

Nwali (2018) opined that as resources shrink or become extinct either due to the effects of climate change or over-exploitation amid the rising population could be a potential source of Boko Haram insurgency (Nwali 2018). Furthermore, all over Nigeria, there is an increasing struggle by different ethnic nationalities over access and or control of scarce resources. As a result of this struggle, there is the tendency of those whose means of livelihood have been displaced by the shrinking resources to migrate in search of alternative means for survival. Often the victims become vulnerable to various forms of deprivation which leads them to various crimes, including Boko Haram insurgency. In other words, there is a linkage between vulnerability induced by environmental change and the insecurity in the northeast (Okpara *et al.* 2015).

The unjust hostility of the Nigerian military towards civilians may have generated sympathy and support for Boko Haram. As a result of unfair military aggression and human rights abuses, hundreds of youth from the family of the victims of Nigerian military torture who died in military detention joined Boko Haram fighters. Amnesty International reports indicate that in the first six months of 2013, 950 people died in military custody extra-judiciously (IRIN 2013).

Attempts by the Nigerian government to negotiate with Boko Haram may have stalled due to distrust from both the government and the terrorist organizations or the factionalized leadership of the different terrorist groups (Agbibo, 2014). The arrest of the Boko Haram negotiation representatives by the government has created distrust and degraded an essential mechanism for achieving peace. This has left the government with no alternative than reliance on military power which has proven ineffective due to inadequate workforce and inferior weapons (Levan 2013).

Kagwanja (2006) faulted the theoretical base of the study of insecurity issues as the underlying factors for a poor understanding of the issues of security in Africa. In line with this argument, he proposed for new strategies in the study of fight against terrorism in Africa to identify new modalities to reduce the high vulnerability of fragile African democracies that may trigger another cycle of insecurity (Kagwanja 2006).

As would be seen in the next section, this article is a departure from the preceding conventional explanations of why the Boko Haram insurgency persists. The article argues that the Boko Haram insurgency persists because of the government's inability to secure Nigeria's porous borders. This is because several reports as indicated below have shown that Boko Haram has an external link with other terrorist organizations operating in neighbouring West African countries and beyond. This network of relationships between the Boko Haram and foreign terror organizations has created an avenue for the exchange of human and material support such as arms and ammunition, training, support funds and mercenaries/Jihadists. Couple with that fact that these weapons were not manufactured in Nigeria, it sound logical that these weapons must have come to Boko Haram as support from foreign terror organizations through the porous Nigerian Borders.<sup>10</sup>

### ***Boko Haram's external link with foreign terror organizations***

There have been a series of debate on whether Boko Haram has any external links with foreign organizations such as the ISIS and Al-Qaida. This argument laid to rest in 2003 when the former leader of Al-Qaida (Osama

---

<sup>10</sup> Interview with the armourer Nigeria military command Headquarters Damaturu, Yobe State. 2 July 2019.

Bin Laden) mentioned Nigeria as one of the countries in Africa to be liberated by the Al-Qaida (Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos 2014). Also, a former Ambassador of the US to Nigeria revealed that the armed Jihadists from Mali are part of the insurgents fighting in Nigeria for Boko Haram as mercenaries. (Lyman *et al.*, 2004).

Consequently, the US-listed Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organizations. Similarly, the UN Security Council in May 2014 added Boko Haram to its list of terrorist organizations (UN 2017). The US and UN listing of Boko Haram and Ansaru significantly contributed to the transformation of the widely acknowledged local terrorist groups to international terror groups operating alongside ISIS, Al Qaida, and Al-Shabaab.

It is widely believed that Boko Haram fighters just like Al-Shabaab and other related groups fighters were trained in ISIS camps in Mali (WARN 2013). Furthermore, Connell argues that Boko Haram insurgents were at Al Qaida in Maghreb (AQIM) training camp in Timbuktu Mali where they learned skills such as servicing Kalashnikovs, shoulder-fired weapons, making and detonation of bombs (Connell, 2012). Furthermore, in 2014, former Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan acknowledged that Boko Haram has an international link with other international terror organizations. They run training camps and indoctrination centres in Mali, Niger, Cameroun, Chad, Sudan, and Central African Republic (News Watch 2014). Another manifestation of Boko Haram's international network is its ability to carry out successful trans-border attacks and abductions across Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroun. For instance, on 4 April 2014 Boko Haram abducted two Italians and a Canadian worker in Cameroun. Niger security arrested three Boko Haram members on 5 May 2014 in Diffa. On 17 May 2014, Boko Haram killed Cameroonian soldier and abducted of 10 Chinese workers in Cameroun. All these examples are clear indications that Boko Haram transcend beyond a local terror organization (Onuoha 2014).

In response to the cross border Boko Haram attacks, the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force on Lake Chad (MNJTF) Security <sup>11</sup> was extended in 2012 to cover Boko Haram cross border insurgency.<sup>12</sup> However, despite the efforts of MNJTF, Boko Haram continues to launch trans-border attacks on neighbouring border towns of the Lake Chad countries. For instance, In January 2020, suspected Boko Haram insurgents attacked the Niger Republic army base, killed at least 89 soldiers and injured many in what appears to be one of the deadliest assault on the Nigerien armed forces (VOA 2020). In March 2020, Chad lost its 92 gallant soldiers to Boko Haram Attack that lasted seven hours at the Boma peninsula (Aljazeera 2020). In the Republic of Cameroun, Boko Haram launch daily attacks and killed people in neighbouring villages of Nigeria-Cameroun (VOA 2019).

The preceding instances of cross border attacks by Boko Haram are indications that it has been able to transform itself from a mere local terror group to a leading international terror organization in West Africa. Its international network enables it to acquire foreign support from other terror organizations operating not just within West Africa but North Africa. What is therefore imperative is for Nigeria to first and foremost,

<sup>11</sup>Nigeria signed multilateral agreements as far back as 1988 with Chad, Niger, and Cameroun to tackle cross border insecurity through Multi-Joint Task Force (MJTF) in Lake Chad basin

<sup>12</sup> Interview with one of the commanders of the Multi-National Joint Task Force, Abuja 18 July 2019.

delink Boko Haram from foreign terror organizations by effectively securing its borders. This will deny Boko Haram access to all kinds of external support in areas of weapons, mercenaries, foreign training for the Boko Haram fighters, and funds from other foreign terrorist organizations.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Nigeria's neighbours have taken other unilateral measures to secure their borders from the infiltration of Boko Haram insurgents into their countries (Onuoha 2014).

### **The Boko Haram insurgency and Nigeria's porous borders: the nexus**

Border enables several political, social, and economic activities; thus, it serves an array of purposes (Agnew 2008, p.175) which may be legal or illegal. Borderlines primarily serve as barriers to protect the insiders from any possible threat of the outsiders. At the same time, they function as a bridge connecting the insiders with outsiders for mutual relations. This implies that territorial security is an extension of internal security, and a well territorially secured state is likely to be peaceful. However, the Nigerian government's efforts to combat the Boko Haram insurgency have neglected border security.<sup>14</sup> This is evident considering the risen number of sophisticated weapons seized from Boko Haram insurgents by the Nigerian security forces at different locations and report of appropriate international authorities such as the United Nations. Coupled with the fact that Nigeria is not an arm producing state, it may be an indication that these weapons are smuggled into the country through the Nigerian porous borders (Onuoha 2013).

Nigeria has 86 formal border posts and over 1400 illegal routes across its land borders (Ailemen, 2019). It shares a total of approximately 4,500 km of land border with Benin, Chad, Cameroun and Niger republic. In the east, Nigeria shares 1,690 km land borders with Cameroun, 87 km with Chad in the northeast, 773 km with Benin republic in the West, and 1,497 km with the republic of Niger in the North (Cross-Border Diaries 2008). The border terrain is characterized by mountains, inaccessible roads and numerous footpaths making effective management of the border a big challenge (Asiwaju 2010).

The porosity of the borders is compounded by corruption and complicity among the border security agencies, lack synergy among border security agencies which invariably affect intelligence gathering/sharing. Furthermore, lack of infrastructural development in the border communities, exclusion of the residents of the border communities in the management of illicit activities on the borders contributes immensely to the porosity of the borders (Okunmu 2010). Furthermore, the Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, Police Force, and host of others who are saddled with the statutory responsibility to manage the Nigerian borders have always complained of inadequate workforce and funding.<sup>15</sup> Digital surveillance facilities to secure the existing 86 formal border post and over 1400 illegal routes are either obsolete or unavailable. This no doubt has compromised any possibility of effective management of goods and individuals crossing the borderlines (Onuoha 2011; Adeola & Fayomi 2012; Akinyemi 2013; Ewetan & Ese 2014). Hence, none of Nigeria's land borders can be described as watertight (The Nation 2017). Blum

<sup>13</sup> Interview with one of the border community leaders in Jibia town. 22 July 2019.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with security consultant on Nigerian borders. 15 December 2019.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with a senior officer of Nigerian Immigration at Nigeria-Niger border (Jibia border) 16 August 2019.

2014; Olaniyan & Yahaya 2016; Okunade 2017; Rufa'i 2018 have attributed the border insecurity in Africa to the porous nature of the borders. They argue that the porosity of the Nigerian borders makes them practically impossible to be manned adequately and effectively. Thus, Nigerian borders are vulnerable to illegal immigration, arms smuggling, human and drug trafficking by the Boko Haram and bandits.<sup>16</sup>

Many of Nigeria's borders are characterized by hundreds of footpaths and illegal routes linking the country with other neighbouring West and North African countries such as Niger, Chad, Cameroun, Libya, Algeria, and Mali. For instance, over 250 unpoliced footpaths are linking Damaturu/Maiduguri in Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun and Chad. For the fact that small and light arms are collapsible, they can simply be concealed and convey into Nigeria through the footpath using camels, donkeys, and motorcycles (Osimen *et al.* 2017). The Nigeria-Benin Republic border, which is approximately 800 kilometres, has become a route for smuggling of arms into Nigeria.<sup>17</sup> From South Western Nigeria, a significant number of weapons cross into the Nigerian territory from other West African states like Liberia and Sierra Leone through the Nigeria-Benin border aided by the cross border arms traffickers and military cartel (Afolayan 2000).

Rufa'i (2008) describe the Nigeria-Niger Republic borderland as a border only by name because the prevailing socio-cultural affinities and historic trade ties between the border communities tend to blur the line separating them. Such close socio-cultural affinity can be an asset since it tends to lend credence to the possibility of a borderless world. As such, the residents of the borders and by extension, other citizens perceived the border as a mere geographical expression and a bridge for facilitating brotherhood rather than barrier.

Historically, Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities share similar languages, cultures, and ancestors who hitherto lived together. However, the creation of the borderlines by the colonialists divide them between the two sides of the post-colonial borders. One typical example is the Hausa ethnic groups in Nigeria which are divided between Nigeria and the Niger Republic, which is why functional disputes sometimes arise from stringent administrative controls at the borders.<sup>18</sup> Although such disputes rarely constitute enough barriers to the unrestrained movement of persons and goods (Rivkin 1963, p.10), because any attempt to control the border by restricting movement often attracts local resistance. Sometimes the unhindered movement of persons and goods, which is a hallmark of good neighbourliness does result in cross-border insecurity. A practice that leads to the challenge of whether to choose good neighbourliness over national security or vice versa (Adetula 2010). However, the recent upsurge in arms smuggling by the Boko Haram insurgents through the border often brings back the physical hard-line imaginary as victims of Boko Haram insurgency look up to the state for protection. This bears to the fact that the possibility of a borderless world evolving in the near future is premature (Paasi 2009).

Lack of adequate training for border security personnel to detect how weapons are concealed and smuggled not only through the illegal but formal border post is another challenge contributing to the porosity

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Head of a border patrol in one of the border posts between Nigeria and Niger. 17 September 2019.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with a retired Director of State Security Service. Sokoto State, Nigeria. 6 August 2019.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with a renowned historian at the Federal University Gusau, Zamfara State. 18 August 2019.

of the Nigerian borders. The border security personnel who are saddled with the statutory responsibility of managing the Nigerian borders lack modern digital surveillance equipment and investigation techniques to detect high-level cross border crimes. The lack of technical know-how and modern equipment exposes Nigeria's borders to the smuggling of illicit arms and mercenaries by the Boko Haram insurgents.<sup>19</sup>

Corruption among the border security personnel is another impediment to effective border security. Most often, border security agents collect bribes and compromise standard surveillance procedures to allow the passage of illegal arms and mercenaries.<sup>20</sup> For instance, in May 2013, a serving senior customs officer was arrested for aiding crossing of a truck loaded with Boko Haram arms and ammunition into the Nigerian territory (Onuoha 2013). Also in 2016, two serving soldiers of the Nigerian army 143 battalions were arrested in Yola town, Adamawa State for supplying ammunition, military uniforms, and explosives to Boko Haram insurgents (PM News 2016).

Inter-agency rivalry resulting from overlapping of responsibilities between the various border security agencies is hindering effective management of the Nigerian borders. The deployment of Nigerian military personnel to the borders in recent times to complement the effort of the conventional border security agencies has created an intense rivalry between the military and para-military personnel at the border. Besides, intra agency rivalry occurs among the personnel of the same agency in an attempt to either grant undue favour or conflict of superiority between different ranks of the same service (Omoigui 2006:11). Inter and intra-agency rivalry affect the possibility of the border security agencies to coordinate, gather and share credible intelligence to effectively secure the border against the illicit arms smuggling by the Boko Haram.<sup>21</sup>

Nigeria's poor data management is the consequence of a lack of a comprehensive citizen's biometric database though this is not only peculiar to Nigeria but for most of the West African countries.<sup>22</sup> In many instances, most nationals of West African states, particularly border communities, possess no national identification cards. Most often, Nigerian security forces intercept Boko Haram fighters without any means of identification as such their nationality could not be ascertained. In some instances, some nationals possess dual or multiple national identifications, such as two or multiple national identification cards or passports. This situation compounded monitoring and control of different nationalities crossing the Nigerian borders a daunting task for the border security agencies.<sup>23</sup>

Consequently, the UN reports that of the 500 million small arms and ammunition circulating in West African sub-region 350 million are in Nigeria. This implies that the number of small arms and ammunition circulating in Nigeria outnumbered the approximately 200 million people of Nigeria. Furthermore, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that about 12,000 illicit cross border arms, including assault rifles numbering 9,000 were stolen and smuggled from Libya after the collapse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi (UNODC 2013). Most of these weapons are brought into Nigerian territory through the porous

<sup>19</sup> Interview with a senior Customs officer in charge of border patrol. 2 August 2019.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with a resident of the Nigeria-Niger border community. 12 October 2019

<sup>21</sup> Interview with the officer of the Nigeria border Police at a duty post at Jibia border. 2 November 2019.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with a university lecturer in one of the local universities. 14 July 2019

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Nigeria Immigration officer in charge of passport issuance. 14 November 2019.

borders (Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce 2016). Illicit arms are smuggled by Boko Haram from as far as Mali, Algeria, and Libya through neighbouring states into Nigerian territory by arms merchants and terror organizations (The Agence Française de Développement & World Bank 2015). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) added that armed insurgency including that of the Boko Haram is one of the drivers of insecurity in Nigeria (Cale *et al.* 2018; International Crisis Group 2016; UNHCR 2015).

The leading traffickers of these weapons are cross-border terrorists and since most of these arms are trafficked through the land borders and traded at the borders, particularly in the Sahel (UNODC 2013), a state like Nigeria with many un-policed illegal routes is both a lucrative market and a victim. For instance, on 31 July 2013, a petrol tanker was intercepted at Daban Masara border town between Nigeria and the Republic of Chad with three RPG chargers, three AK 47 rifles, nine AK 47 magazines, two bombs and 790 rounds of 7.62 special ammunitions suspected to be for the Boko Haram (Audu 2013). Similarly, on 25 September 2019, the Nigerian troops arrested eight illegal immigrants along the Yola road alleged to be members of the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) fighting for Boko Haram (Aluko 2019). On 25 March 2018 Cameroon's security forces arrested several Boko Haram fighters including women and children attempting to smuggle arms and explosives into Nigeria through the Nigeria-Cameroun border (Kindzega 2018).

Despite substantial budgetary allocation on security, including the recent release of \$1 billion for the purchase arms to fight insurgency (Reuters 2017), Nigerian security forces continue to intercept hundreds of weapons such as AK 47 rifles, RPGs, rockets launchers, dozens of armoured personnel carriers and anti-aircraft missiles in various locations across Nigeria. Since Nigeria does not manufacture, the majority of these weapons found their way into Nigeria through the porous borders and their accessibility by the Boko Haram fighters sustains the insurgency. Therefore, the Nigerian authorities must evolve new strategies to secure the country's porous borders to substantially block all forms of foreign assistance to Boko Haram from foreign terrorist organizations operating in neighbouring states and beyond.<sup>24</sup>

## **Conclusion and recommendations**

This article interrogates the resilience of the Boko Haram insurgency for over a decade despite intensive military offensive, negotiation, and amnesty for the repentant insurgents that denounce insurgency. It may be argued that Nigeria government have recorded success in the fight against Boko Haram, especially when compared to 2014-2015 when Boko Haram insurgent control over 22 local governments in the northeast. Even at that, recording success is not synonymous with achieving victory. This article argues that border security is an essential component of national security, and they must be secured effectively and efficiently. The porosity of the Nigerian borders enables the Boko Haram to smuggle weapons, mercenaries and receive support funds from other foreign terrorist organization. Thus, there is a causal linkage between the porosity

---

<sup>24</sup> Interview with a retired military officer and a security consultant. 11 October 2019.

of the Nigerian borders, arms trafficking through the porous borders and the resilience of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Although, Nigeria has three categories of borders; land, maritime and air borders, the scope of this article is limited to the interrogation of Nigerian land borders and the resilience of Boko Haram insurgency. This is not to conclude that Boko Haram does not receive any external support from foreign terror organizations through the air and maritime borders. Therefore, there is a need for further research to ascertain whether or not Boko Haram receive external support from the Nigerian air and maritime borders. The article concludes that for Nigeria to achieve victory against Boko Haram insurgency, it must strategically secure its land borders to delink Boko Haram from foreign terror organizations and deny them access to arms, training, foreign mercenaries, and support funds. Delinking can be achieved through the following recommendations:

**E-border technology:** In the contemporary world, states are embracing e-border technology to complement the analogue border patrol method. Considering the vast size (4500 km) of the Nigerian borders, inaccessible roads and inadequate border security workforce, the use of digital surveillance devices is imperative more than ever than before. Surveillance facilities such as drones, helicopters, video cameras, scanners, electric wire fencing technology and night vision glasses for the border security personnel should be introduced as measures to secure the borders against illegal crossing and arms smuggling by the Boko Haram insurgents.

**Continues training of border security agents:** Borders are not static but dynamics in their evolution process and securitization. As border security managers designed new strategies to secure borders, so the border security breakers evolve new ways to access territories illegally. As such, there is a need to train, re-train and expose border security agents to the new dynamics of border security. Continuous training will equip border security agents with new knowledge and techniques to intercept the Boko Haram weapons and mercenaries crossing the Nigerian borders.

**Recruitment of additional border security workforce and logistics:** The agencies saddle with the constitutional responsibilities of securing Nigeria's land borders often complained of inadequate workforce and logistics. Border patrol vehicles are not just inadequate but unserviceable. For instance, in the ever-busy Jibia border axis of Nigeria-Niger Republic border, the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) has only one serviceable patrol vehicle, the same thing goes to other border security agencies at the borders.<sup>25</sup> There is a need for additional workforce and procurement of patrol vehicles and power bikes to secure the ungoverned footpath space used by the Boko Haram mercenaries to cross the border.

**Welfare and security of the border security personnel:** One of the reasons often cited for widespread corruption among the border security personnel is the poor condition of service in terms of poor remuneration, lack of better health care services, housing, and other opportunities. Often, after retirement from service, border security retirees find it difficult to access their gratuity and monthly pension promptly. There is a need for the provision of adequate health care for the border security personnel and their families, decent accommodation, a stable pension, prompt payment of gratuity and fair pay to boost their morale.

---

<sup>25</sup> Author's interview with a senior officer of the Nigeria Service, Jibia border, Katsina State. 26 September 2019.

Inter and Intra synergy between border security agencies: Intelligence gathering is critical in border security. However, inter/intra agency rivalry is one of the obstacles for smooth intelligence management. Synergy is often lacking among the various agencies responsible for the management of the Nigerian borders. This arises mainly from the overlapping of functions and statutory responsibilities among sister agencies. To avoid rivalry and rancour among border security agents, there is a need for a well-articulated job description and a clear reporting line for all the stakeholders' in-charge of border security. Also, the Nigerian government must, as a matter of urgency constitute a high powered supervisory body to oversee the working relationship between the border security agencies to ensure improved synergy.

Inclusion of the border communities in the management of the borders: Border security requires the effort of all stakeholders (government and non-governmental). However, Nigerian border managers neglect the role of the resident of the border communities in the management of the borders. The exclusion of the residents of the border communities denies the border security agencies crucial information about the movement of Boko Haram arms and mercenaries. Therefore, the government must incorporate and encourage the residents of the border communities to volunteer useful intelligence to the security agencies to intercept any external support for Boko Haram.

## References

- Adeniyi, Olusegun. (2011). *Power, Politics, and Death: A Front Row Account of Nigeria under the late President Yar'adua*. Lagos: Prestige.
- Adeola, Gabriel Lanre, and Fayomi, Oluyemi. (2012). The Political and Security Implications of Cross Border Migration between Nigeria and Her Francophone Neighbors. *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*. 1 (3): 1-9.
- Adetula, Victor A. (2010). Between national security considerations and good neighbourliness: Nigeria and the challenge of cross-border crime in West Africa. In Bassey, C. O. and Oshita, O. O. (ed.), *Governance and border security in Africa*. Lagos, Benin, Ibadan, Jos, Port-Harcourt, Zaria: Malthouse Press Limited. Pp. 295-308.
- Afolanyan, Adejummoke A. (2000). *Trans-border Studies-Trans-border Movement and Trading* Spectrum Books. Ibadan.
- Agbibo, Daniel E. (2014). Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37 (1): 41-67.
- Agnew, John. (2008). Borders on the mind: Re-framing border thinking. *Ethics and Global Politics*. 1 (4): 175-191.
- Ailemen T (2019) FEC approves N52b for the e-border project. *Business Day*, 25 April.
- Akinyemi, Omolara Mabel. (2013). Globalization and Nigeria border security: Issues and challenges *International Affairs and Global Strategy* 11: 1-7
- Andreas, Peter. (2003). Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century. *International Security*, 28 (2):78-111.

- Aljazeera, (2020). 92 Chad soldiers killed in 'deadliest' Boko Haram attack. Aljazeera 25 March. Available online at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/92-chad-soldiers-killed-deadliest-boko-haram-attack> (accessed on 20 April 2020).
- Aluko, Oluleye. (2019). Army arrest eight foreign nationals working for Boko Haram. *Punch*, 1 October. Available online at <https://punchng.com/army-arrests-eight-foreign-nationals-working-for-bharam/> (accessed on 2 April 2019).
- Asiwaju, Anthony Ijaola. (2010). *Development of Border Regions*. Joe Tolalu and Associates Nig. Ltd. Ikeja: Lagos.
- Audu, Ola. (2013). Soldiers nab top customs officer for allegedly ferrying arms for Boko Haram. *Premium times*. 28 May.
- Audrey, Kurth Cronin. (2002). Behind the curve: Globalization and international terrorism. *International Security*. 27 (3): 30-58
- Blum, Constanze. (2014). *Cross-border flows between Nigeria and Benin: What are the challenges for human security?* Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Connell, Shannon. (2012). To be or not to be: Is Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization? *Global security studies*. 3 (3) 87-93.
- Cross-Border Diaries. (2008). Kano-Katsina-Maradi cross-border co-operation initiative. Bulletin on West African Local-Regional Realities, Issue 08. SWAC-OECD.
- Dionne, Shannon. (2019). Boko Haram is Back. With better drones. *The New York Times*. 13 September. Available online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html> (accessed on 22 April 2019).
- Elise, Labott, and Greg Botello. (2013). US designates Boko Haram, its offshoot as terrorist organizations. Available online at <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/13/world/africa/boko-haram-us/index.html> (accessed on 4 September 2019).
- Eromo, Egbejule. (2019). Death, Anguish, and flickers of hope: 10 years of Boko Haram. *Aljazeera Centre for Studies*. Available online at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/death-anguish-flickers-hope-10-years-boko-haram-190729161220796.html> (accessed on 26 March 2020).
- Olabanji Olukayode Ewetan, and Ese Urhie. (2014). Insecurity and socio-Economic development in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development Studies*. 5 (1): 40-63.
- Cale Salih, Ron Slye, Mark Freeman, Mara Revkin & Vanda Felbab-Brown. (2018). *The limit of punishment, transitional justice, and violent extremism: Nigeria Case Study*. Institute for integrated transition. United Nations University. Pp.4-126
- Goldberg, Anne. J. (2001). Transnationalism and borderlands: Concepts of space on the US- Mexico border and beyond. *Estudios Fronterizos*, 2 (4):.49-91.
- Gorman George. (2009). Islamist violence grips northern Nigeria. *FDD's Long War Journal*. July 28. Online at [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/07/islamist\\_violence\\_gr.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/07/islamist_violence_gr.php) (accessed on 21 April 2020).

- Global Conflict Tracker. (2020). *Boko Haram in Nigeria*. Council on Foreign Relations <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria> (accessed on 20 April 2020).
- Haselsberger, Beatrix. (2014). Decoding borders. Appreciating border impacts on space and people. *Planning Theory & Practice*, Volume 15, Issue 4, Pp. 505-526.
- IRIN News. (2013). *Call for ICC probe into the Nigerian military*. IRIN, 16 July. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/98426/call-for-icc-probe-into-nigerian-military> (accessed on 25 March 219),
- John, Danfulani. (2013). Boko Haram insurgency: A need to re-think Nigeria borders security doctrine and doctrine operations. *South-south Journal of culture and development*. 15 (2): 1-15
- Kagwanja, Peter. (2006). Counterterrorism in the horn of Africa: New security frontiers old strategies. *Security Review*, 15:(3): 72-86.
- Kindzega, Moki Edwin. (2018). Cameroon arrests Boko Haram fighters and accomplices. VOA 25 March Available online at <https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-arrests-boko-haram-fighters-and-accomplices> (accessed on 20 February 2020)
- Konrad, Victor. (2015). Towards a theory of borders in motion. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. 3 30:1-17.
- Levan, Cari. (2013). Sectarian Rebellions in Post-Transition Nigeria Compared, *Journal of Intervention and State Building*, 7(3): 335-352.
- Lyman, Princeton, and Morrison, Stephen. (2004). The terrorist threat in Africa. *Foreign Affairs*. 83: (1): 75–86.
- Vesselin, Popovski, and Benjamin Maiangwa. (2016). Boko Haram's attacks and the people's response: A fourth pillar' of the responsibility to protect? *African Security Review*. 25 (2): 159-175.
- Marsico, Giuseppina, and Achille Varzi. (2016). Psychological and social borders: Regulating Relationships. In J. Valsiner, G. Marsico, N. Chaudhary, T. Sato, and V. Dazzani (eds.), *Psychology as a science of human being*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.327–336.
- Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos. (2014). Nigeria's interminable insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis. Chatham House. 1-36. Available online at: [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field\\_document/20140901BokoHaramPerouseMontclos\\_0.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20140901BokoHaramPerouseMontclos_0.pdf) (accessed on 22 February 2020).
- Maza, Dingji Kangdim, Aksit Sait, Koldas Umut. (2020). Challenges of countering terrorist recruitment in the Lake Chad region: The case of Boko Haram. *Religions* 11(2): 96.
- Meehan Patrick and Speier Jackie. (2011). Boko Haram: The emerging threat to US Homeland? Subcommittee Report on counterterrorism and intelligence on Homeland security, House of Representatives. 12<sup>th</sup> Congress 1st Session, pp. 1-29 Available online at: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-112HPRT71725/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf> (accessed on 22 April 2019).

- Miles, William. F. S.( 2005). Development, not division: Local versus external perceptions of Nigeria boundary. *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 43 (2): 297-320.
- Moki Edwin Kindzeka 2019. Cameroon records daily Boko Haram attacks along Nigeria border VOA, 12 December. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-records-daily-Boko-haram-attacks-along-Nigeria-border> (accessed on 16 March 2019).
- Newman, David. (2003). On borders and power: A theoretical framework. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18 (1): 13-25.
- News Watch. (2014). The world must unite to fight Boko Haram. *News Watch*, 18 June.
- Nwali, Uche. (2018). *Sustainable human security in Africa: Exploring the effects of diminishing natural resources and low sovereign wealth funds*. A Conference Paper Presented at the International Conference on “Human Security Threats in Africa” held at the Institute of African and Diaspora Studies, J. P. Clarke Building, University of Lagos/Nigerian Institute of Stored Products Research, Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria, December 13 -14.
- Ogunmade, Omololu and Michael Olugbode. (2017). FG Launches an action plan to prevent counter-terrorism. *This Day*, 27 November, available online at: [https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/11/29/fglaunches-action-plan-to-prevent-counter-t errorism/](https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/11/29/fglaunches-action-plan-to-prevent-counter-terrorism/) (accessed on 22 April 2019).
- Okpara, Uche T., Stringer, Lindsay. C. Stringer, Andrew J. Dougill, and Muhammed D. Bila. (2015). Conflicts about water in Lake Chad: Are environmental, vulnerability, and security issues linked? *Progress in Development Studies*. 15 (4): 308-325.
- Okunade, Samuel. K. (2017). Perspectives on illegal routes in Nigeria. *Africa Research Review*. 2 (46): 14-24.
- Olalekan, Babatunde A. (2018). The Recruitment Mode of the Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Nigeria. *Peace Review*, 30 (3): 382-389.
- Olaniyan, Azeez, and Aliyu Yahaya. (2016). Cows, bandits, and violent conflicts: Understanding cattle rustling in Northern Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 51(3), 93–105.
- Olarewaju, John, and Lestwa, A. M. (2018). An assessment of state and non-state responses to the Boko Haram crises in Nigeria. *International journal of social sciences and conflict management*. 3 (2): 79-98
- Omoigui, A. Nowa. (2006). Inter-Service Relations: Imperative for Jointness”. Being a Lecture delivered at the National War College (Defense College). Abuja, 27 January.
- Onuoha C. Francis. (2014). A Danger not to Nigeria alone- Boko Haram transnational reach and regional responses Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional Office, Abuja, Nigeria.
- Onuoha, C. Francis, 2011. Small and light weapons proliferation and human security in Nigeria. *Conflict Trends* (1) 50-56
- Onuoha, C. Francis. (2013). Porous borders and Boko Haram’s arms smuggling operations in Nigeria. *Aljazeera Center for Studies*. Pp. 1-7

- Onuoha, C. Freedom (2013). Porous borders and Boko Haram's arms smuggling operations in Nigeria. *Aljazeera*, 9 August
- Osimen, G. U, Anegbode E, John A, Clement A. and Oyewole, O. O. (2007) The borderless- border and Internal Security Challenges in Nigeria: *International Journal of Political Science*. 3(3): 17-27.
- Paasi, Anssi. (2009). Bounded spaces in a borderless world: Border studies, power, and the anatomy of territory. *Journal of Power*. 12 (2): 213-234.
- Perouse de Montclos, M. (2014). "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis". *African Program*: Chatham House- The Royal Institute of International Affairs. September.
- Punch. (2016). Buhari Inaugurates Presidential Committee on North-East Initiative. *Punch* 26 October. Available online: <https://punchng.com/buhari-inaugurates-presidential-committee-north-east-initiative-full-speech/> (accessed on 14 July 2019).
- PM News. (2016). Nigerian Army arrest two soldiers working with Boko Haram. *PM News*, 10 February. Available online at <https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2016/02/10/nigerian-army-arrest-two-soldiers-working-with-boko-haram/> (accessed on 18 July 2019).
- Reuters. (2017). Nigeria to release \$ 1 billion from excess crude account to fight Boko Haram. *Reuters* 14 December. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/nigeriato-release-1-billion-from-excess-oil-account-to-fight-boko-haram-idUSKBN1E821A> (accessed on 22 August 2019).
- Rivkin, Arnold. (1963). *The African presence in world affairs: national development and its role in foreign policy*. Free Press: Glencoe
- Rufa'i, M. Alkali. (2018). Cattle rustling and armed banditry along Nigeria-Niger borderlands. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 23:4, 66-73.
- Sodipo Michael Olufemi (2013). Mitigating radicalism in northern Nigeria. Africa Security Brief. Centre for Strategic Studies. 31/08/ <https://africacenter.org/publication/mitigating-radicalism-in-northern-nigeria/> (accessed on 11 December 2019).
- Stephanie, Busari, and Adebayo Bukola. (2018). Hundreds of schoolgirls flee suspected Boko Haram attackers in Nigeria. CNN <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/20/africa/hundreds-schoolgirls-flee-boko-haram-attackers/index.html> (accessed on 19 July 2019).
- The Agence Française de Développement and the World Bank. (2015). The challenge of stability and security in West Africa. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank.
- Transparency international report (2019). Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/country/NGA> (accessed on 14 January 2020).
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013). Transnational organized crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment. Vienna: UNODC.

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015). Nigeria: Country of Origin Information (COI) Compilation. Dakar: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Representation for West Africa.
- United Nations. (2010). Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2010/693 31 December 2010.
- Vaughan-Williams, N. (2012). *Border Politics: The limits of sovereign power*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.
- VOA. (2018). Nigerian Police Arrest Suspected Mastermind of 2015 Abuja Bombings. *VOA*, 21 December. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerian-police-arrest-suspected-mastermind-2015-abuja-bombings> (Accessed on 10 June 2018)
- VOA. (2020). Security Sources: Niger army base attack death toll hits 89. *VOA*, 11 January Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/africa/security-sources-niger-army-base-attack-death-toll-hits-89> (accessed on 14 January 2019).
- Walker, Andrew. (2012). What Is Boko Haram? Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Available online at <http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram> (accessed on 16 May 2019).
- WARN. (2013). Is the African Giant Drowning but not Waving? – Exploring a Coordinated Approach to the Nigerian Security Challenges, West Africa Network for Peace building: Policy Brief: Available online at <http://www.wanep.org/wanep/warn/policy-briefs.html> (accessed on 26 April 2019).
- Zenn, Jacob. (2013). Co-operation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru after the Mali intervention in CTC Sentinel. *Combatting Terrorism Centre, West Point*. 6:3 1-8